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The Broker's Claim to a Commission When His
Customer Buys Direct or Through Another Broker
WMLIAM S. CUDLIPP, JR.

Very few lawyers in general practice in Virginia have not
been consulted at one time or another about the right of a real
estate broker to collect a commission on a sale of property consummated directly by the owner or through another broker
with a customer found by the first broker. The majority of the
disputes of this nature never reach the courts and undoubtedly the great majority of those that do are finally settled at
the trial court level. Nevertheless the Virginia reports contain a number of decisions involving such cases, and opposite
results have sometimes been reached under substantially similar circumstances. The purpose of this brief note is to examine some of these decisions and to state certain conclusions
that may be of some assistance to practitioners who are called
upon to give advice upon and possibly litigate such matters.
Sales Closed by the Owner
Where the transaction involves a sale effected at the price,
upon the terms, and within the period of the listing the
broker's right to the commission is beyond question if it can
be established as a matter of fact that he was the procuring
cause of the sale. Conflict in the cases exist only where the
contract has been closed by the owner at a lesser price or
upon terms more favorable to the purchaser than those contained in the listing.
In Long v. Flory & Garber,112 Va. 721 (1911), the defendant, Long, listed his property with the plaintiffs, Flory &
Garber, real estate brokers, for sale at a price of $16,800 of
which $800 was to be paid to them as a commission in the
event of a sale. At the plaintiffs' request the price was reduced to $16,000, of which $500 was to be paid to the brokers.
One Cline became interested in the property through the
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plaintiffs' efforts but refused to pay $16,000 for it. Long sold
it for $15,500 to another person who shortly thereafter transferred it to Cline for $15,500 under circumstances that
strongly indicated that it was a "straw man" transaction
although Long was unaware of this when he made the contract. In reversing the judgment in favor of the brokers, the
court stated that Long would have been within his rights if he
had sold directly to Cline unless in so doing he thwarted a
sale to him by the brokers at the price of $16,000. The court
said at page 723 that the governing principle in this class of
cases is stated in a West Virginia decision as follows:
Under a special contract between an owner of real
estate and an agent for the sale thereof, on commission,
at a price agreed upon, the agent cannot recover his commission without proving that he has actually made' a sale
at the price stipulated, unless it appear that his principal
has wrongfully prevented the making of a sale at such'
price, which would have been made, but for his interference, or has waived the strict performance of the contract.
. . . It may have been a hard contract, and the plaintiff
may have entered into it under a misapprehension of the
law; but that cannot relieve him from the terms of his
contract. In order to recover, he is bound to show compliance with it. This he has utterly failed to do, so far as
the evidence shows; for he does not pretend to show that
he procured a purchaser for the property, or made a sale
of it, at a price which under his contract would have entitled him to commission.
The effect of this decision seems clear; if property is listed
with a broker at a fixed price the broker may recover only
if he produces a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy at
that price. However, less than a year later the same justices
reached an opposite result in Paschall & Gresham v. iflliss,
113 Va. 643 (1912). There the broker, Gilliss, was allowed a
commission under the following facts: The defendants agreed
to let Gilliss attempt to sell a tract of timber and to pay him
a commission of five per cent in the event of a sale at $200,000.
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Gilliss brought the property to the attention of one Johnson
and the defendants undertook to assist in the negotiations. In
the absence of Gillis, Johnson contracted directly with the defendants to purchase the property for $180,000. The defendants refused to pay Gilliss a commission on the sale contending that they had reduced the price because Johnson had told
them that Gilliss had stated that the quantiy of timber was
less than had been estimated when the $200,000 price was set
and because he had abandoned his efforts to sell. Gilliss
denied making any such statement to Johnson and also denied
abandoning the negotiations. The trial court had refused the
following instruction offered by the defendants:
The court instructs the jury that the contract entered
into between the parties in this suit was a contract for
the payment of a commission in the event of a sale at the
fixed price of $200,000; and if they believe from the evidence that said timber was sold for less than $200,000,
then they must find for the defendants. 75 S.E. 220, 221
(1911).
It seems obvious that the instruction was drawn in reliance
upon the Long case, nevertheless the refusal to grant it was
upheld. The court said that Long
was very different... In the former case the contract
between the owner and the agent fixed the minimum
price at which the property was to be, sold and the agent
failed to find a purchaser or to effect a sale at the stipulated price. Moreover there was no evidence tending to
prove that the principal had wrongfully prevented the
agent from making a sale at such price, or had waived
the strict performance of the contract.
...

The listing here provided for a commission of five per cent
on a sale at $200,000 while in Long, the listing first provided
for a commission of $800 on a sale at $16,800 and was later
modified to a commission of $500 on a sale at $15,500. In each
case the sale was closed by the owner at a lesser figure and
there was no evidence in either that a sale could have been
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made at the fixed price if the broker had handled the transaction alone. This statement is substantiated by the following
quotation from a Pennsylvania decision set forth in Paschall
& Gresham which clearly indicates that the result would have
been the same even if the evidence had affirmatively shown
that Johnson wouldn't have purchased at $200,000:
If 'vendors were permitted... to employ brokers to
look up purchasers, and call the attention of buyers to
property which they desired to sell, limiting them as to
terms of sale, and then, when such purchasers were negotiating, take the matter in their own hands, avail themselves of the labor, services, and expenses of the broker
in bringing the property into market, and accomplish a
sale by an abatement in the price, and yet refuse to pay
the broker anything, the business of a broker would not
be worth pursuing; gross injustice would be done; every
unfair and illiberal vendor would limit his property at a
price slightly above the market, and make use of the
broker to bring it into notice, and then make his own
terms with the buyers, who were in reality procured by
the efforts of the agent'. 113 Va. 643, 655 (1912).
In Arwood v. Hill's Adm'r., et at., 135 Va. 235 (1923), the
property was ligted with the broker for sale at $15,000 but he
was instructed to submit for approval any lesser offer. He obtained an offer of $12,000 from one Gray but the defendant
refused to accept it. Before leaving on a trip the broker urged
Gray to offer $15,000 and while he was away Gray did offer
$14,000 directly to the owner, who accepted. In allowing the
commission the court cited Paschail& Gresham. The decision
is not inconsistent with Long for, while a definite price was
mentioned in the listing, the broker was requested to submit a
lesser price if obtained, thus tending to negate the strict
"special contract" concept upon which Long was predicated.
The following year, in Leicht-Benson, etc. Corp. v. Stogie &
Co., Izc. 138 Va. 511 (1924), the facts were as follows: The
property was listed with the broker for sale at $14,000. He
showed the property to two ladies who said they could not
buy unless, as part of the consideration, they could exchange
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a house and lot owned by them. The broker told them he would
see about it and communicated the suggestion to the defendant
corporation's secretary who said he didn't believe the deal
could be made but agreed to look at the house and let the
broker know. The broker heard nothing more, but a few days
later the defendant entered into a contract of exchange with
the ladies at a price of $13,000. The court reversed the judgment in favor of the broker stating that so far as the proposition to exchange the properties was concerned the broker
was a mere volunteer whose services were not accepted. However, without referring to Paschall & Gresham, or to Arwood,
-the court said at page 514: "It is impossible to reconcile
either the expressions of the courts or the various cases involving the commissions of real estate brokers .... ".
The court also said that the Long case was applicable and
that it supported the following view:
One distinction which seems sometimes to be overlooked is as to the specific character of the employment.
If the broker is employed generally to find a purchaser
and introduces him to the owner, and they negotiate a
sale, the broker is entitled to his commission; but a different rule applies, or should apply, where the terms of
the sale or exchange are specifically fixed in advance,
and the broker's authority is limited to finding a purchaser who will buy the property upon the prescribed
terms. In the latter instance, in the absence of deceit or
fraud on the part of the owner, the broker is entitled to
no commission, unless he finds such a purchaser, and such
a special contract should not restrain the owner from
seeking, in good faith, to find a purchaser for his property on different terms. 138 Va. 511, 514 (1924).
It will be observed that neither here nor in Long did the
listing stipulate that the commission would be paid only if a
sale was made at the price in the listing.
In Patton, Temple & Williamson, Inc. v. Garnett, 147 Va.
1009 (1926), the Special Court of Appeals followed LeichtBenson, etc. Corp. and Long. No reference was made to Paschal & Gresham or to Arwood. Here the lowest price at which

THE BROKER'S CLAIM TO A COMMISSION

193

the broker was authorized to sell the property was $11,000 and
he offered it without success to one Mitchell for $11,500. The
owner in good faith revoked the broker's authority to sell and
two days later sold directly to Mitchell at $10,000. There was
no evidence that Mitchell would have paid $11,000 or that the
revocation was to prevent a sale at that figure. The court said
that under such circumstances a listing for an indefinite time
is revocable at the owner's pleasure and denied the broker's
claim. The finding that there was a revocation made in good
faith might be deemed to distinguish it from Paschall &
Gresham had the court not said, "The contract is one of
hazard, to the extent that the agent performs his services
without compensation, if he does not find the purchaser. But
the production of a purchaser at the agreed price is in the
nature of a condition ptecedent, and is the very essence of
the undertaking by the agent." 147 Va. 1009, 1016 (1926).
At this point, although Paschall & Gresham had not been
expressly overruled, it would be reasonable to conclude that
if a definite price has been fixed in the listing and if it contains no direction to submit any lower figure, a sale to the
broker's customer could be made by the owner at a price less
than the listing without any liability for commissions unless
the broker could show that the owner's action precluded him
from selling at the stipulated price.
However, the next case, Blankenship, et al. v. Childress, 183
Va. 13 (1944), casts serious doubt upon the correctness of this
conclusion for while it discussed and distinguished Patton,
Temple & Williamson, Leicht-Benson, etc. Corp. and Long it
reiterated the view expressed in Paschall & Gresham and
other cases therein cited that the owners are "not permitted
to reap the benefit of the plaintiff's labor and then deny him
his just reward". The listing in the case was at a price of
$60,000 and the sale to the plaintiff's customer was made by
the owners at that figure. The defendants denied that the commission was due because the sale was made on a deferred purchase money basis and not for cash. The listing was silent as
to how the price was to be paid and the court noted that gen-
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erally in such cases the broker is required to produce a cash
customer. The court allowed the commission emphasizing
however that it was the defendants who offered to accept this
method of payment and it had not been requested by the customer. On the foregoing facts it could be said that the holding
does not affect the previous decisions in any way, but the following statement unquestionably favors the principle asserted
in Paschall & Gresham:
If the agency contract were intended by its provisions
to require the broker to procure a purchaser who would
pay $60,000 in cash for the property, and the plaintiff
produced a purchaser who would pay only $20,000 in cash
and $40,000 on terms, and the owners, by independent
negotiations with the customer of the plaintiff, accepted
the $20,000 cash and the $40,000 on terms while the
agency contract was still in force, they cannot escape
liability for the commission of the plaintiff. This is true
even where the owner has closed a sale with a customer
of the broker for a lesser amount than that authorized
183 Va. 13, 21 (1949).
for the broker to obtain ....
In 1945 the court had before it Wilson et al v. Schvmidt &
Wilson, Inc., 184 Va. 642 (1945). The facts were these: a
bank, the guardian of an incompetent owner of the property
in question, listed it for sale at $16,000 with a number of
brokers, including the plaintiff, Schmidt & Wilson, Inc. The
listing stipulated that any offer would be subject to the approval of the court in which a suit to sell the property was
pending. Through the efforts of the plaintiff, two persons, the
defendants Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, became interested in the
property and although they said the price of $16,000 was
"prohibitive", plaintiff's representative was to show them
the interior of the house as soon as it could be arranged with
an officer of the bank. Mrs. Wilson then by-passed the broker
and commenced negotiations with the bank which was later
made aware of the plaintiff's efforts. She offered $13,000
which was refused, and then offered $13,500 which was finally
accepted by the court. When the matter of a commission to
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the plaintiff was brought to the attention of the court the
Wilsons agreed to be responsible for it if any was found to be
due.,
The court affirmed the trial judge's findings that the broker
was the procuring cause and the allowance of a commission.
It said that the case came under the general rule supported in
Virginia by Paschall & Gresham, by Blankenship, and by
other Virginia cases. This general rule was quoted from 8
Am. Jur., Brokers, § 190, pp. 1101, 1102:
The rule is well established, that if property is placed
in the hands of a real-estate broker for sale at a certain
price or upon certain terms, and a sale is brought about
through the broker as a procuring cause, he is entitled
to commissions on the sale even though the final nogotiations are conducted through the owner, who in order to
make a sale accepts a price less than that stipulated to
the broker or terms more liberal than those the latter
was authorized to accept. 184: Va. 642, 651 (1945).
Reference was also made to an exception to the general rule
and quoted from 8 Am. Jur., Brokers, §190, p. 1102, as follows:
*J. .if the broker's contract of employment expressly
makes the payment of commissions dependent on the
obtaining of a certain price for the property he cannot
recover, even though the owner sells at a less price to a
person to whom the broker first shows the property, unless the broker is prevented from making the sale by the
fault, fraud, or bad faith of the principal. (Emphasis
supplied) Id. at 652.
The court said that this exception is supported by Long and
Leicht-Benson, etc. Corp. but that the case at bar did not come
within the exception so exemplified. It said that the listing of
$16,000 was intended as an "asking price" or guide to the
broker and was not a special contract whereby the broker's
right to commissions was predicated upon a sale at the stipulated price. The court pointed to the following circumstances
to support this view: The property was worth only from
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$13,000 to $14,000; under the terms of the listing, any offer
was subject to the approval of the court; and prior to the acceptance of the Wilsons' offer the highest offer the bank had
received was $13,500 and this was made subject to a real
estate commission.
It may be argued with considerable force and merit that
none of these considerations satisfactorily distinguish the
cases that are said to support the exception to the general
rule; that there is nothing to indicate that the guardian knew
the property was "worth only from $13,000 to $14,000" when
the listing was made; that the fact that any offer submitted
was subject to the court's approval was simply a sensible
precaution against possible liability of the bank to the broker
if an offer of $16,000 was presented but rejected by the court
which alone had power to accept it; and that the fact that the
highest offer was less than the listing price is in keeping with
normal experience and was not indictative of a conscious overpricing of the property.
If the court intended to follow the general rule as quoted
by it from 8 Am. Jur. Brokers, § 190, and fully recognize the
exception thereto as also quoted in the opinion there really
was no need for it to find that the $16,000 figure was only an
"asking price", for there was no evidence whatever that the
listing contract expressly made the submission of a customer
at that figure a condition of the right to a commission.
The opinion also quoted from the Restatement, Agency,
§ 447, comment .b (1933) as follows:
Common agreements with brokers. In the ordinary
case where the principal promises a broker a commission
for finding a purchaser and the asking terms are stated
to the broker, the usual interpretation is that the asking
terms are intended merely to guide the broker in starting
negotiations, and the broker is to have his commission
if he produces a customer ready and willing to purchase
on the asking terms or on such modified terms as the
principal may subsequently accept before the agency is
revoked. 184 Va. 642, 654 (1945).
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Section 447 of the Agency Restatement, which was not
quoted by the court, states the rule in this manner:
An agent whose compensation is conditional upon his
procuring a transaction on specified terms is not entitled
to such compensation if, as a result of his efforts, a transaction is effected on different or modified terms, although
the principal may thereby benefit.
Comment a., to § 447 of the Agency Restatement, which was
not quoted in the opinion, reads:
Strictness of the rule. The rule stated in this Section
gives effect to the bargain the parties have made, but the
harshness of the result frequently gives a reason for interpreting the principal's promise as not containing such
an exacting condition. The principal may, however, by
clear language so condition his .promise to pay commissions that the commission is payable only if the broker
obtains the original specified price or other terms, even
though the principal closes the transaction at a lesser
price, and on different terms, with the broker's customer.
A condition thus clearly stated is effective unless there is
evidence that subsequent to the original offer by the
principal he agrees to pay a commission upon an altered
basis if the broker should produce a customer willing to
pay a lesser price. (Emphasis supplied).
Despite the views expressed in these quotations from the
Restatement of Agency it appears that by its consideration of
other facts and circumstances the court indicated that it was
unwilling simply to examine the terms of the listing contract
to ascertain if the owner had therein "by clear language"
conditioned his promise to pay commissions.
In Edwards v. Cragg, 188 Va. 564 (1948), although most of
the cases above were commented upon, no additional light is
supplied because of the unusual facts involved. No commission was allowed but the broker, who had made a special
agreement to provide financing so that the purchasers could
pay all cash as the listing expressly required, defaulted in
this undertaking and the owner was obliged to make a new
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contract with the purchasers, giving terms. The court stressed
the fact that the owner, at the request of the broker, had permitted the purchasers to take possession prior to the settlement and that this possibly constrained the owner to agree
to terms instead of insisting upon cash.
Ford v. Gibson, 191 Va. 96 (1950) is another case where
commissions were claimed on a sale closed by the owner. The
purchaser had beeen shown the property by the broker more
than a year prior to the sale but the owner was unaware of
this fact. The court in affirming the denial of commissions
stated that the jury was justified in finding that the broker
was not the procuring cause of the sale and that the defendant
in good faith had revoked the right to sell prior to the sale.
In B. A. Poff & Company, Inc. v. Ottaway, et al., 191 Va.
779 (1951), a commission was denied the broker who had presented an offer to purchase by one Allen. The offer called for
settlement in cash and was accepted by the defendants on the
broker's representation that Allen could perform it. Allen was
unable to do so and the contract was rescinded but the broker
was given an opportunity to negotiate a new contract on
terms that Allen could meet. When the broker declined its
authority was revoked and a contract was effected with Allen
by the owners. It was held not only that the revocation by the
defendants was in good faith but also that they were the final
procuring cause of the sale.
Summary
Despite the fact that the court has not found it necessary to
overrule Long, Leicht-Benson, etc. Corp., or Patton, Temple
& Williamson, Inc., the latest decisions show that, where the
owner consummates the sale with a purchaser procured by the
broker, the mere fact that the sales price is less or the terms
of settlement more liberal than provided in the listing is not
enough to deprive the broker of a commission. It must appear
either from the listing agreement or from the listing and other
facts and circumstances that the parties intended to make the
production of a customer, ready, willing, and able to meet all
of the provisions of the listing a condition precedent to the
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recovery of commissions. And the statement in the listing of
a definite price for the property is not alone sufficient to
disclose such an intent.
Sales Closed Through Another Broker
The Virginia cases applicable to these situations are not in
conflict as the following examination of them will disclose.
In the case of Cannon v. Bates, 115 Va. 711 (1914), two
brokers, the plaintiff, Bates and another, Elam, were bothl
negotiating with the same customer for the sale of the same
property. Bates was the first to show the property to him but
Elam obtained the offer that was accepted. Each broker knew
of the other's efforts. A judgnent in favor of Bates was reversed because of erroneous instructions and the case was
remanded for further proceedings. The court said that where
two or more brokers are employed, if each knows of the employment of the other and neither is preferred over the other
by the principal, he may sell to the purchaser who is first
produced and the broker producing the purchaser is entitled
to the commission. The court quoted the following from a New
Jersey case:
It would be at variance with all practical rules to require the party selling to pronounce, under the penalty
of paying double commissions, upon the metaphysical
question, which agent under the circumstances was the
efficient cause of the sale. In the absence of all collusion
on the part of the vendor, the agent through whose instrumentality the sale is carried to completion is entitled
to the commission. 115 Va. 711, 719 (1914).
The court also quoted with approval a statement that in the
absence of "special circumstances" which would make it
proper to so charge him the principal ought not to be held
liable for commissions to more than one broker and should
not be required, at his peril to determine whether some broker
other than the one who produced the customer was the procuring cause of this sale. Both of these quotations involved
cases where the rival brokers knew of the competition. The
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court indicated that a different rule would apply if the competing brokers were not each aware of the activity of the
other. Id. at 720.
In Smith-Gordon Co., Inc. v. Snellings, 130 Va. 528 (1921),
the plaintiff who first showed the property to the ultimate
purchaser but who had been unable to get him to make an
acceptable offer for it sought a commission on the sale made
by another broker to whom the defendant had paid a commission. Plaintiff claimed that it had an exclusive agency and
that it was the effective cause of the sale. The trial court had
resolved both questions of fact against the plaintiff. The appellate court, at page. 531, affirmed denial of the commission
and said that the case was controlled by the rule in the
Cannon case "to the effect that where more than one broker
is authorized by the owner to make a sale, the broker who is
the procuring cause thereof is alone entitled to the commissions". It would be more accurate to say that the broker who
was not the procuring cause. of the sale is not entitled to the
commisison.
The court allowed the broker to recover a commission in
ONey v. Jamison et al., 175 Va. 420 (1940) although the owner
had paid a reduced commission to another broker who had
procured the offer of $13,500 that was accepted. The plaintiff
had previously obtained and submitted an offer of $13,000
from the ultimate purchaser but it had been refused even
though it met all of the terms of the listing. The broker who
presented the offer that was accepted had never shown the
property to the purchaser and was a friend of the defendant's
family and accepted a very small commission for his services.
It is obvious that the court felt- that the defendant had not
acted in good faith in the transaction.
The decision in the Oney case can also be justified upon the
ground asserted and sustained in Washington et al. v. Garrett et al., 189 Va. 57 (1949), namely that a broker who produces a customer. ready, willing, and able to purchase in accordance with the terms of the listing, need not obtain a
written contract unless the listing so stipulates. In this case
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the lower court sustained a demurrer to plaintiffs' motion for
judgment which alleged that the plaintiffs had performed all
of the services that produced the sale except that they had not
obtained a signed offer. The written offer was secured by
another broker who presented it to the owner. The owner
knew all of these facts but was content to accept the second
broker's assurance that he would work out with the. plaintiffs
the matter of commissions. The appellate court reversed. This
reversal is clearly not in conflict with the views expressed in
the Cannon case since the facts alleged constitute "special
circumstances" that made the general rule therein stated
inapplicable.
Atkinson v. S. L. Nisbaum & Co., Inc. et al., 191 Va. 82
(1950) is the most recent case dealing with the point here
under discussion. There two brokers were endeavoring to sell
the property to the same customers, Mr. and Mrs. Davis, under circumstances which the court found should have caused
the plaintiff to learn of the competition. The plaintiff first
showed the property to the Davises and obtained their interest but he was unable to bring them to the point of making an
offer. He did not even report his negotiations to his principal.
Another broker by questionable tactics induced the Davises
to deal through him and procured an offer which was accepted. The owner was unaware of this improper conduct and
acted in utter good faith and with strict neutrality between
the rival brokers. The court held that the plaintiff had failed
to show that his services were the "efficient, predominating
and procuring cause of the sale" and affirmed the judgment
for the owner. The court also discussed at length the Cannon
and Washington cases and said that they were controlling.
Summary
In each case where the broker has been permitted to recover despite the fact that the written contract with his purchaser was actually prsented by another broker it has been
found that the former was the procuring cause of the sale
and that the owner had knowledge of that fact. On the other
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hand a broker who was not the procuring cause of the sale
never has been allowed to recover.
The court has not had before it a case where the owner,
unaware that the plaintiff broker was the procuring cause of
the sale, in good faith has paid or has obligated himself to pay
a commission to another broker who actually produced the
purchaser. Dicta in Cannon and in Atkinson indicate that
under these circumstances the owner should not be held liable
for double commissions if the rival brokers were each aware
of the other's employment. However, dicta in the same cases
indicate that under the same circumstances the owner may be
held liable to the plaintiff broker where such broker was
ignorant of the other broker's employment. As a practical
matter the latter situation will seldom, if ever, arise since. a
broker employed on a non-exclusive listing is usually aware
that the owner has or will list the property with other brokers.
The distinction indicated by the dicta apparently is predicated upon the feeling that where the plaintiff broker knows
of the competition he must pursue his negotiations with his
customer to the. point of actually obtaining and submitting the
offer to the owner before his competitor can do so. But if he
is unaware of the competition he need only produce his purchaser before the listing expires or before it is revoked in
good faith by the owner.

